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Earth Energy Log

India crosses 100 GW of integrated solar module capacity in 2026

ALMM-listed solar module capacity in India reached about 194 GW by May 2026, but ALMM-listed cell capacity sits near 30 GW — a roughly six-to-one module-to-cell gap. From 1 June 2026 the ALMM List-II cell mandate forces government and open-access projects onto domestic cells, while wafer and polysilicon imports remain almost total.

By Priya Sharma· Reviewed by Pruthvi A.···9 min read

In 50 words: India's ALMM-listed solar module capacity reached roughly 194 GW by May 2026, but ALMM-listed cell capacity is only about 30 GW — a near six-to-one gap. From 1 June 2026 the List-II cell mandate forces government and open-access projects onto domestic cells, while wafers and polysilicon stay almost wholly imported.

India's solar manufacturing story in 2026 is no longer about modules. On paper the country is a module powerhouse: capacity enlisted under the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM) List-I crossed 193.9 GW in May 2026, far above the original "100 GW" milestone the industry celebrated in 2025. The constraint has moved one step upstream — to cells, where ALMM-listed capacity is only around 30 GW — and one step further still, to wafers, ingots and polysilicon, where India remains almost entirely import-dependent. The decisive policy event is the enforcement of ALMM List-II for solar cells from 1 June 2026, which legally ties government-supported demand to domestic cell supply for the first time.

Table of contents

  1. The headline numbers, corrected
  2. The cell-to-module gap
  3. ALMM List-II: the cell mandate is now live
  4. The PLI scheme: where the money landed
  5. TOPCon and HJT: the line ramp-up
  6. The wafer and polysilicon problem
  7. What to watch next
  8. Frequently asked questions

1. The headline numbers, corrected

An earlier version of this article reported India's module capacity at around 100 GW and cell capacity at 60 GW. Both figures were out of date or conflated different denominators, and we have corrected them against MNRE's own monthly ALMM revisions.

The verified picture as of mid-2026:

  • Modules (ALMM List-I): about 193.9 GW as of the May 2026 revision, after roughly 20.7 GW was added in that update alone. The list stood near 144.8 GW in January 2026 and 173.1 GW in March 2026 — growth has been almost vertical.
  • Cells (ALMM List-II): about 30.3 GW as of the seventh revision, dated 30 April 2026, which included heterojunction (HJT) cell capacity from Reliance Industries.
  • The ratio: ALMM-listed cell capacity is roughly 15 percent of ALMM-listed module capacity. Even allowing for non-ALMM nameplate capacity, the structural shortfall is real.

Two caveats matter. First, "module capacity" here means capacity enlisted under ALMM, not capacity actually running at high utilisation — real-world output is lower than nameplate. Second, some trade reports quote higher cell figures (50–65 GW) drawn from total announced or operational nameplate capacity rather than the ALMM list; we anchor on the ALMM numbers because this is the metric that now governs procurement eligibility.

2. The cell-to-module gap

The bigger story is what is missing: cells. With about 194 GW of listed module capacity sitting above roughly 30 GW of listed cell capacity, the arithmetic is stark. The overwhelming majority of India's module lines still depend on imported cells — primarily from China, with some flow from Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia.

This gap is not just an industrial-policy talking point. CBAM-style carbon measures in the EU and tightening domestic-content rules in the United States mean Indian module exporters increasingly need traceable, low-carbon, ALMM-eligible cell supply. A module assembled in Gujarat from a Chinese cell carries the embedded footprint and the trade-policy exposure of that cell. Closing the gap is therefore both a domestic-supply question and an export-competitiveness question.

For developers, the gap also shapes pricing. As List-II enforcement concentrates demand on a thin domestic cell base, cell prices inside India can decouple upward from global cell prices — a margin squeeze for standalone module makers who do not own cell lines. See our coverage at /topics/solar and /topics/policy for how this feeds into tender economics.

3. ALMM List-II: the cell mandate is now live

The single most consequential renewables-policy move of 2026 in India is no longer pending — it is in force. From 1 June 2026, ALMM List-II for solar cells took effect. The earlier version of this article described the cell list as "expected by Q3 2026"; that timeline has been overtaken by events and is corrected here.

What the mandate does:

  • All government and government-supported solar projects, plus net-metering and open-access projects commissioned on or after 1 June 2026, must use modules built with cells sourced from ALMM List-II manufacturers.
  • Module makers on List-I who do not source from List-II are being moved to a separate sub-list, ALMM List-I(a) — effectively a downgrade that excludes their modules from the mandated demand pool.
  • MNRE refused blanket extensions but offered case-by-case time extensions for projects that had completed module installation but were not yet commissioned, subject to documentation.

The friction is obvious: with only about 30 GW of listed cell capacity feeding nearly 194 GW of listed module capacity, standalone module makers without their own cell lines face a genuine supply crunch in the second half of 2026. Industry bodies sought extensions citing TOPCon supply constraints; manufacturers with integrated cell capacity pushed back, arguing that delay would strand their investments. The government held the date.

4. The PLI scheme: where the money landed

The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for high-efficiency solar PV modules is the policy engine behind the module boom — and the clearest evidence of where India's supply chain is still thin.

Key figures from IEEFA's assessment (as of June 2025):

  • Module capacity commissioned under PLI: about 31 GW against a 65 GW target — roughly 48 percent.
  • Investment: about Rs 48,120 crore mobilised against a Rs 94,000 crore target — roughly 51 percent.
  • Direct jobs: about 38,500 against a 195,000 target — roughly 20 percent.

Tranche-I (December 2021) awarded about 8.7 GW of fully integrated, polysilicon-to-module capacity to Reliance New Energy, Adani New Industries and Shirdi Sai Electricals. Tranche-II (April 2023) spread roughly Rs 24,000 crore across distributed configurations — polysilicon-to-module, wafer-to-module and cell-to-module. The pattern is telling: downstream module capacity over-delivered, while upstream integration lagged. As of mid-2025, India had achieved a high share of its module ambition but a far smaller share of polysilicon capacity, and several integrated projects slipped beyond their original 2026 deadlines.

For the financing context behind these numbers, see /topics/finance.

5. TOPCon and HJT: the line ramp-up

The cell capacity that does exist is shifting decisively to n-type technology. The seventh ALMM List-II revision added Reliance's heterojunction (HJT) cells, and Reliance also added about 3.5 GW of HJT module capacity in the May 2026 List-I update. TOPCon, however, remains the workhorse of the Indian ramp.

Concrete line additions in this cycle:

  • Premier Energies commissioned a 1.2 GW TOPCon cell line at Fab City, Hyderabad, taking its annual cell capacity from about 2 GW to 3.2 GW, with a stated efficiency above 25 percent and a 16-busbar design. The company is targeting roughly 8.4 GW of cell and 11.1 GW of module capacity by June 2026.
  • Tata Power has begun cell production at its large single-location plant in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, part of a roughly 4.3–4.8 GW cell-and-module complex.
  • Reliance is commissioning its giga-scale integrated facility in Jamnagar, designed to span modules, cells, wafers, ingots, polysilicon and glass — the most ambitious vertical integration attempt in the country.

The technology mix matters for the cell mandate: as TOPCon and HJT lines ramp, the quality of domestic cells rises toward what export markets and high-DCR tenders demand, not just the quantity. For how cell choice feeds inverter and system design, see /topics/inverter.

6. The wafer and polysilicon problem

Even a fully closed cell-to-module gap would leave India dependent on imports one layer deeper. Wafers, ingots and polysilicon are the genuine chokepoint.

As of mid-2025, India's operational polysilicon capacity was only about 3.3 GW and wafer capacity about 5.3 GW — trivial next to a near-194 GW module base. In the first half of 2025, no new ingot, wafer or polysilicon capacity was brought online at all. China controls upward of 90 percent of global polysilicon output, and India's machinery, components and much of the technical expertise for these steps are themselves imported.

Two policy moves bracket the problem:

  • ALMM List-III for ingots and wafers is scheduled to take effect from June 2028, signalling that the government intends to extend domestic-content discipline upstream — but only after a two-year runway.
  • MNRE is reported to be discussing a dedicated PLI scheme for polysilicon, on the view that ALMM alone may not suit polysilicon because the stakeholders and economics differ. The MNRE secretary has publicly framed polysilicon as "the last major gap" in the chain. No budget or timeline has been finalised.

Until then, even brand-new Indian cell and module lines will run on imported wafers for at least the next couple of years.

7. What to watch next

The next 18 months turn on three things:

  1. List-II supply adequacy. Whether domestic cell capacity scales fast enough — toward 50 GW and beyond — to keep the mandate workable without choking module makers. India has roughly 171 GW of cell and 279 GW of module capacity reported as under construction toward 2030; how much arrives on schedule is the question.
  2. Upstream policy. Whether the polysilicon PLI is approved and how ALMM List-III for wafers is sequenced into 2028.
  3. Export positioning. Whether integrated, low-carbon Indian cells can meet EU CBAM and US domestic-content tests well enough to turn India from a module assembler into a genuine upstream exporter.

If the cell-to-module ratio rises materially from today's roughly one-to-six toward something closer to balance by end-2027, India's solar-export competitiveness changes in kind, not just degree. For regional context, see /regions/in.

Frequently asked questions

How much solar module manufacturing capacity does India have in 2026?

About 193.9 GW of solar module capacity was enlisted under the ALMM List-I as of the May 2026 revision, up from roughly 144.8 GW in January and 173.1 GW in March 2026. Note this is ALMM-listed nameplate capacity, not actual annual output, which runs lower at real-world utilisation rates.

How much solar cell capacity does India have, and why is it so much lower than module capacity?

ALMM List-II cell capacity stood at about 30.3 GW as of the seventh revision dated 30 April 2026 — roughly 15 percent of listed module capacity. Cells are far more capital-intensive and technically demanding than module assembly, so investment historically flowed to the easier downstream step first. The cell mandate is now designed to pull capital upstream.

What is ALMM List-II and what changed on 1 June 2026?

ALMM List-II is MNRE's approved list of domestic solar-cell manufacturers. From 1 June 2026, government and government-supported projects, plus net-metering and open-access projects commissioned on or after that date, must use modules built with List-II cells. Module makers on List-I who do not source List-II cells are moved to a separate ALMM List-I(a) and lose access to mandated demand.

Does India still import solar wafers and polysilicon?

Yes, almost entirely. Operational polysilicon capacity was only about 3.3 GW and wafer capacity about 5.3 GW as of mid-2025, against a near-194 GW module base. ALMM List-III for ingots and wafers is not due until June 2028, and a dedicated polysilicon PLI is still only under discussion. Even new domestic cell lines will run on imported wafers for the next two years.

How is the solar PLI scheme performing?

Mixed. As of mid-2025, the PLI scheme had commissioned about 31 GW of module capacity against a 65 GW target (roughly 48 percent), mobilised about Rs 48,120 crore of a Rs 94,000 crore target, and created about 38,500 of a targeted 195,000 direct jobs. Downstream module capacity over-delivered while upstream integration — cells, wafers, polysilicon — lagged.

Which Indian companies lead in solar cell manufacturing?

The cell base is led by integrated and fast-scaling players including Premier Energies (about 3.2 GW after a new 1.2 GW TOPCon line, targeting 8.4 GW), Tata Power (a roughly 4.3–4.8 GW complex in Tirunelveli), Reliance (giga-scale HJT and integrated capacity in Jamnagar), Adani Solar and Waaree, which is adding cell capacity in Gujarat. Most new lines use n-type TOPCon or HJT technology.


Researched and drafted with AI assistance; reviewed and edited by the named editor within 24 hours of draft.

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